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Abstract. Recent work has considered the problem of extending to the case of
iterated belief change the so-called ‘Harper Identity’ (HI), which defines single-
shot contraction in terms of single-shot revision. The present paper considers the
prospects of providing a similar extension of the Levi Identity (LI), in which the
direction of definition runs the other way. We restrict our attention here to the
three classic iterated revision operators–natural, restrained and lexicographic, for
which we provide here the first collective characterisation in the literature, under
the appellation of ‘elementary’ operators. We consider two prima facie plausible
ways of extending (LI). The first proposal involves the use of the rational closure
operator to offer a ‘reductive’ account of iterated revision in terms of iterated
contraction. The second, which doesn’t commit to reductionism, was put forward
some years ago by Nayak et al. We establish that, for elementary revision op-
erators and under mild assumptions regarding contraction, Nayak’s proposal is
equivalent to a new set of postulates formalising the claim that contraction by
¬A should be considered to be a kind of ‘mild’ revision by A. We then show that
these, in turn, under slightly weaker assumptions, jointly amount to the conjunc-
tion of a pair of constraints on the extension of (HI) that were recently proposed
in the literature. Finally, we consider the consequences of endorsing both sug-
gestions and show that this would yield an identification of rational revision with
natural revision. We close the paper by discussing the general prospects for defin-
ing iterated revision in terms of iterated contraction.
Keywords: belief revision · iterated belief change · Levi identity.
1 Introduction
The crucial question of iterated belief change–that is, the question of the rationality con-
straints that govern the beliefs resulting from a sequence of changes in view–remains
very much a live one.
In recent work [3], we have studied in some detail the problem of extending, to the
iterated case, a principle of single-step change known as the ‘Harper Identity’ (hence-
forth ‘(HI)’) [15]. This principle connects single-step contraction and revision, the two
main types of change found in the literature, in a manner that allows one to define the
former in terms of the latter. We presented a family of extensions of (HI) characterised
by the satisfaction of an intuitive pair of principles and showed how these postulates
? This research was partially supported by the Australian Government through an ARC Future
Fellowship (project number FT160100092) awarded to Jake Chandler.
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could be used to translate principles of iterated revision into principles of iterated con-
traction.
But (HI) also has a well known companion principle which reverses the direction
of definition, allowing one to define single-step revision in terms of single-step con-
traction: the Levi Identity (henceforth ‘(LI)’) [20]. To date, furthermore, the issue of
extending (LI) to the iterated case has barely been discussed. Two noteworthy excep-
tions are the short papers of Nayak et al [21] and of Konieczny & Pino Pe´rez [17].
The second paper argues that no reasonable extension of (LI) will enable us to reduce
iterated revision to iterated contraction. The first paper introduces a non-reductionist
extension of (LI) consonant with this claim.
The present contribution aims to provide a more comprehensive discussion of the
issue, carried out against the backdrop of the aforementioned recent work on (HI). The
plan of the paper is as follows. After a preliminary introduction of the formal frame-
work in Section 2, we provide, in Section 3, a novel result that is of general interest
in itself. We collectively characterise the three classic belief revision operators that are
the focus of the paper (natural, restrained and lexicographic) under the appellation of
‘elementary’ operators, showing that they are in fact the only operators satisfying a par-
ticular set of properties. Section 4 turns to the issue of extending (LI) to the iterated
case. We present, in Section 4.1, an extension of (LI) based on the concept of rational
closure, which would result in a reduction of two-step revision to two-step contraction.
Section 4.2 then discusses the non-reductive proposal of [21]. We first establish that, for
elementary revision operators and under mild assumptions regarding contraction, it is in
fact equivalent to a new set of postulates formalising the claim that contraction by ¬A
should be considered to be a kind of ‘mild’ revision by A. These, in turn, under slightly
weaker assumptions, are proven to jointly amount to the conjunction of the aforemen-
tioned constraints on the extension of (HI) that were proposed in [3]. In Section 4.3,
we consider the consequences of endorsing both suggestions and show that this would
yield an identification of rational revision with natural revision. In Section 5, we briefly
discuss the general prospects for defining iterated revision from iterated contraction,
critically assessing the central argument of [17]. We conclude, in Section 6, with some
remaining open questions.
The proofs of the various propositions and theorems have been relegated to a tech-
nical appendix.
2 Preliminaries
The beliefs of an agent are represented by a belief state Ψ . The latter determines a
belief set [Ψ ], a deductively closed set of sentences, drawn from a finitely generated,
propositional, truth-functional language L. The set of classical logical consequences of
Γ ⊆ L will be denoted by Cn(Γ ). The set of propositional worlds or valuations will be
denoted by W , and the set of models of a given sentence A by [[A]].
We consider the three classic belief change operations mapping a prior state Ψ and
input sentence A in L onto a posterior state. The operation of revision ∗ returns the
posterior state Ψ ∗A that results from an adjustment of Ψ to accommodate the inclusion
ofA, in such a way as to maintain consistency of the resulting belief set when¬A ∈ [Ψ ].
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The operation of expansion + is similar, save that consistency of the resulting beliefs
needn’t be ensured. Finally, the operation of contraction ÷ returns the posterior state
Ψ ÷A that results from an adjustment of Ψ to accommodate the retraction of A.
2.1 Single-step change
In terms of single-step change, revision and contraction are assumed to satisfy the pos-
tulates of Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson [1] (henceforth ‘AGM’), while the
behaviour of expansion is constrained by [Ψ + A] = Cn([Ψ ] ∪ {A}). AGM ensures
a useful order-theoretic representability of the single-shot revision or contraction dis-
positions of an agent, such that each Ψ is associated with a total preorder (henceforth
‘TPO’) 4Ψ over W , such that [[[Ψ ∗ A]]] = min(4Ψ , [[A]]) ([14,16]). In this context,
the AGM postulate of Success (A ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]) corresponds to the requirement that
min(4Ψ∗A,W ) ⊆ [[A]]. We denote by TPO(W ) the set of all TPOs over W and shall
assume that, for every 4∈ TPO(W ), there is a state Ψ such that 4=4Ψ .
Equivalently, these revision dispositions can be represented by a ‘conditional belief
set’ [Ψ ]c. This set extends the belief set [Ψ ] by further including various ‘conditional
beliefs’, expressed by sentences of the formA⇒ B, where⇒ is a non-truth-functional
conditional connective and A,B ∈ L (we shall call Lc the language that extends L
to include such conditionals). This is achieved by means of the so-called Ramsey Test,
according to which A ⇒ B ∈ [Ψ ]c iff B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]. In terms of constraints on [Ψ ]c,
AGM notably ensures that its conditional subset corresponds to a rational consequence
relation, in the sense of [19] (we shall say, in this case, that [Ψ ]c is rational).
Following convention, we shall call principles couched in terms of belief sets ‘syn-
tactic’, and call ‘semantic’ those principles couched in terms of TPOs, denoting the
latter by subscripting the corresponding syntactic principle with ‘4’.
The operations ∗ and÷ are assumed to be related in the single-shot case by the Levi
and Harper identities, namely
(LI) [Ψ ∗A] = Cn([Ψ ÷ ¬A] ∪ {A})
(HI) [Ψ ÷A] = [Ψ ] ∩ [Ψ ∗ ¬A]
with single-shot revision determining single-shot expansion via a third identity:
(TI) [Ψ +A] = [Ψ ∗A], if ¬A /∈ [Ψ ]
= L, otherwise
(LI) can of course alternatively be presented as [Ψ ∗A] = [(Ψ ÷¬A) +A]. Note that,
given (HI) and (LI), the constraint [[[Ψ ∗ A]]] = min(4Ψ , [[A]]) is equivalent to [[[Ψ ÷
¬A]]] = min(4Ψ ,W )∪min(4Ψ , [[A]]), so that4Ψ equally represents both revision and
contraction dispositions.
The motivation for (LI) is the following: The most parsimonious way of modifying
[Ψ ] so as to include A is to simply add the joint logical consequences of [Ψ ] and A.
However, Cn([Ψ ] ∪ {A}) needn’t be consistent. Hence we first ‘make room’ for A
by considering instead the belief set [Ψ ÷ ¬A] that results from making the relevant
minimal change necessary to achieve consistency.
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2.2 Iterated change
In terms of iterated revision, we shall considerably simplify the discussion by restricting
our attention to the three principal operators found in the literature. These are natural
revision [8]:
x 4Ψ∗NA y iff (1) x ∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]), or (2) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]) and x 4Ψ y
restrained revision [6]:
x 4Ψ∗RA y iff (1) x ∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]), or (2) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]) and either (a)
x ≺Ψ y or (b) x ∼Ψ y and (x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]])
and lexicographic revision [22]:
x 4Ψ∗LA y iff (1) x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], or (2) (x ∈ [[A]] iff y ∈ [[A]]) and
x 4Ψ y.3
See Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Elementary revision by A. The boxes represent states and associated TPOs. The lower
case letters, which represent worlds, are arranged in such a way that the lower the letter, the
lower the corresponding world in the relevant ordering. The columns group worlds according to
the sentences that they validate. So, for example, in the initial ordering, we havew ≺ y ≺ x ∼ z,
with y, z ∈ [[A]] and x,w ∈ [[¬A]] and then, after lexicographic revision by A, y ≺ z ≺ w ≺ x.
All three suggestions operate on the assumption that a state Ψ is to be identified with
its corresponding TPO 4Ψ and that belief change functions map pairs of TPOs and
sentences onto TPOs, in other words, they entail:
(Red) If 4Ψ=4Ψ ′ , then, for any A, 4Ψ∗A=4Ψ ′∗A
3 These are three of the four iterated revision operators mentioned in Rott’s influential survey
[23]. The remaining operator the irrevocable revision operator of [24], which has the unusual
characteristic of ensuring that prior inputs to revision are retained in the belief set after any
subsequent revision.
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The proposals ensure that ∗ satisfies the postulates of Darwiche & Pearl [10]. In their
semantic forms, these are:
(C1∗4) If x, y ∈ [[A]] then x 4Ψ∗A y iff x 4Ψ y
(C2∗4) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]] then x 4Ψ∗A y iff x 4Ψ y
(C3∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x ≺Ψ y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y
(C4∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x 4Ψ y, then x 4Ψ∗A y
Regarding÷, we assume that it satisfies the postulates of Chopra et al [9], given seman-
tically by:
(C1÷4) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]] then x 4Ψ÷A y iff x 4Ψ y
(C2÷4) If x, y ∈ [[A]] then x 4Ψ÷A y iff x 4Ψ y
(C3÷4) If x ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]] and x ≺Ψ y then x ≺Ψ÷A y
(C4÷4) If x ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]] and x 4Ψ y then x 4Ψ÷A y
Concerning the relations between the belief change operators in the iterated case, we
will be discussing the extension of (LI), as well as that of (TI), later in the paper. Re-
garding (HI), a proposal for extending the principle to the two-step case was recently
floated in [3]. Semantically speaking, this involved the characterisation of a binary TPO
combination operator ⊕, such that 4Ψ÷A=4Ψ ⊕ 4Ψ∗¬A. Among the baseline con-
straints on ⊕, were a pair of conditions that were shown to be respectively equivalent,
in the presence of (C1∗4) and (C2
∗
4), to the following joint constraints on 4Ψ÷A, 4Ψ
and 4Ψ∗¬A:
(SPU4) If x ≺Ψ y and x ≺Ψ∗¬A y then x ≺Ψ÷A y
(WPU4)If x 4Ψ y and x 4Ψ∗¬A y then x 4Ψ÷A y
We called operators satisfying such postulates, in addition to (HI), ‘TeamQueue com-
binators’.
3 Elementary revision operators
In this section, we demonstrate the relative generality of the results that follow by pro-
viding a characterisation result according to which natural, restrained and lexicographic
revision operators are the only operators satisfying a small set of potentially appealing
properties. We shall call operators that satisfy these properties elementary revision op-
erators. We define elementary revision operators semantically by:
Definition 1. ∗ is an elementary revision operator iff it satisfies (C1∗4)-(C4∗4),
(IIAP∗4), (IIAI
∗
4) and (Neut
∗
4).
We have already introduced (C1∗4)-(C4
∗
4). The remaining principles are new. We call
the first of these ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with respect to the prior TPO’,
after an analogous precept in social choice. For this, we first define the notion of ‘agree-
ment’ between TPO’s on a pair of worlds:
6 J. Chandler and R. Booth
Definition 2. Where 4Ψ ,4Ψ ′∈ TPO(W ), 4Ψ and 4Ψ ′ agree on {x, y} iff
4Ψ ∩{x, y}2 = 4Ψ ′ ∩{x, y}2.
then offer:
(IIAP∗4) If x, y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]) ∪min(4Ψ ′ , [[A]]), then, if 4Ψ and 4Ψ ′ agree on
{x, y}, so do 4Ψ∗A and 4Ψ ′∗A
The second new principle–‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with respect to the
input’–is formally similar to the first. For this we first introduce some helpful notation:
Definition 3. (i) x 4A y iff x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]], (ii) x ∼A y when x 4A y and
y 4A x, and (iii) x ≺A y when x 4A y but not y 4A x.
The principle is then given by:
(IIAI∗4) If x, y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]) ∪min(4Ψ , [[B]]), then, if 4A and 4B agree on
{x, y}, so do 4Ψ∗A and 4Ψ∗B
Although this principle is new to the literature, we note that it can be shown to be
equivalent, under our assumptions, to the conjunction of a pair of principles that were
recently defended in [5], where it was shown that they respectively strengthen (C3∗4)
and (C4∗4):
Proposition 1 Given (C1∗4)–(C4∗4), (IIAI
∗
4) is equivalent to the conjunction of:
(β1∗4) If x 6∈ min(4Ψ , [[C]]), x ≺A y, and y 4Ψ∗A x, then y 4Ψ∗C x
(β2∗4) If x 6∈ min(4Ψ , [[C]]), x ≺A y, and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x
The final principle is a principle of ‘Neutrality’, again named after an analogous condi-
tion in social choice. To the best of our knowledge, it appears here for the first time in
the context of belief revision. Its presentation makes use of the following concept:
Definition 4. Where A ∈ L, pi is an A-preserving order isomorphism from 〈W,4Ψ
,4A〉 to 〈W,4Ψ ′ ,4A〉 iff it is a 1:1 mapping from W onto itself such that
(i) x 4Ψ y iff pi(x) 4Ψ ′ pi(y), and
(ii) x 4A y iff pi(x) 4A pi(y)
and proceeds as follows:
(Neut∗4) x 4Ψ∗A y iff pi(x) 4Ψ ′∗A pi(y), for any A-preserving order isomorphism pi
from 〈W,4Ψ ,4A〉 to 〈W,4Ψ ′ ,4A〉
(IIAP∗4) and (IIAI
∗
4) say that the relative ordering of x and y after revising by A de-
pends on only (i) their relative order prior to revision (from (IIAP∗4)) and (ii) their
relative positioning with respect to A (i.e., whether or not they satisfy A) unless one
of x or y is a minimal A-world, in which case this requirement acquiesces to the Suc-
cess postulate (from (IIAI∗4)). (Neut
∗
4) is a form of language-independence property,
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stating that the labels (in terms of valuations) of worlds are irrelevant in determining
the posterior TPO. The prima facie appeal of these principles is similar to that of their
analogues in social choice, substituting a doxastic interpretation of the ordering for a
preferential one.
With this in hand, we can now report that:
Theorem 1. The only elementary revision operators are lexicographic, restrained and
natural revision.
(IIAP∗4) significantly weakens a principle introduced under the name of ‘(IIA)’ in [12],
which simply corresponds to the embedded conditional: If4Ψ and4Ψ ′ agree on {x, y},
so do 4Ψ∗A and 4Ψ ′∗A. (IIAI∗4) amounts to a similar weakening of a condition found
in [7]. An interesting question, therefore, arises as to why the stronger principles do not
figure in our characterisation.
The unqualified version of (IIAP∗4) is only satisfied by ∗L, assuming (C1∗4) and
(C2∗4) and that the domain of the revision function isTPO(W ). Indeed, let x ∈ [[A]] and
y ∈ [[¬A]]. Then, for any 4Ψ , there will exist 4Ψ ′ in TPO(W ) that agrees with 4Ψ on
{x, y} and is such that x ∈ min(4Ψ ′ , [[A]]) (and, since y ∈ [[¬A]], y /∈ min(4Ψ ′ , [[A]])).
But by AGM, if x ∈ min(4Ψ ′ , [[A]]) but y /∈ min(4Ψ ′ , [[A]]), then x ≺Ψ ′∗A y. So, by
the unqualified version of (IIAP∗4), x ≺Ψ∗A y. Hence, if x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], then
x ≺Ψ∗A y, a condition only satisfied by ∗L, assuming (C1∗4) and (C2∗4).4
Similarly, Booth & Meyer’s strong version of (IIAI∗4), in conjunction with (C1
∗
4)–
(C4∗4), can be shown to entail a principle that we have called ‘(β1+
∗
4)’ in previous work
[5], where we showed (see Corollary 1 there) to characterise lexicographic revision,
given AGM and (C1∗4)-(C2
∗
4).
5
4 Extending the Levi Identity
4.1 A proposal involving rational closure
The most straightforward syntactic extension of (LI) would involve replacing all belief
sets by conditional belief sets, leaving all else unchanged. This would require extending
the domain of Cn to subsets of the conditional language Lc, which can be naturally
achieved by setting, for∆ ⊆ Lc,Cn(∆) = ∆∪Cn(∆∩L). So we would be considering
the claim that [Ψ ∗ A]c = Cn([Ψ ÷ ¬A]c ∪ {A}). This, however, is a bad idea, since it
is easy to show that:
Proposition 2 If [Ψ ∗A]c = Cn([Ψ ÷¬A]c ∪ {A}), then there are no consistent belief
sets, given the two following AGM postulates:
4 We note that [12] offers a rather different characterisation of lexicographic revision that also
involves the unqualified version of (IIAP∗4).
5 In the proof of Proposition 1 above, we established the equivalence between (IIAI∗4) and the
conjunction of (β1∗4) and (β2∗4) using only (C1∗4)– (C4∗4). This proof can be adapted to
establish a strengthening of Booth & Meyer’s Proposition 3 in which, unlike in the original,
the principle of ‘Independence’ (P∗4) is not appealed to. In other words: In the presence of
AGM and (C1∗4)– (C4∗4), Booth & Meyer’s strengthening of (IIAI∗4) is equivalent to the
conjunction of what [5] call ‘(β1+∗4)’ and ‘(β2+∗4)’.
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(K2∗) A ∈ [Ψ ∗A]
(K2÷) [Ψ ÷A] ⊆ [Ψ ]
The core issue highlighted by this result is that the right hand side of the equality won’t
generally correspond to a rational consequence relation, due to the fact that Cn simply
yields too small a set of consequences. So a natural suggestion here would be to make
use of the rational closure operator Crat of [19] instead of Cn. Indeed, Crat has been
touted as offering the appropriately conservative way of extending a set of conditionals
to something that corresponds to a rational consequence relation (see [19]). This gives
us the ‘iterated Levi Identity using Rational Closure’ (or ‘(iLIRC)’ for short):
(iLIRC) [Ψ ∗A]c = Crat([Ψ ÷ ¬A]c ∪ {A})6
4.2 Nayak et al’s ‘New Levi Identity’
An alternative extension of (LI) can be obtained by using an iterable expansion operator
+. This is the ‘New Levi Identity’ of Nayak et al, which is briefly presented in [21].
Semantically, it is given by:
(NLI4) 4Ψ∗A=4(Ψ÷¬A)+A
Syntactically, in terms of conditional belief sets, we then would have: [Ψ ∗A]c = [(Ψ ÷
¬A) +A]c.
It is easily verified that (LI) follows from (NLI4), if one assumes, for instance, that
÷ satisfies (C1÷4). Indeed, (LI) amounts to min(4Ψ , [[A]]) = min(4Ψ÷¬A,W )∩[[A]] =
min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]), which immediately follows from (C1÷4). (NLI4) also has some
other interesting general properties. For example, one can show, rather trivially, that:
Proposition 3 If ∗ and÷ satisfy (NLI4), then, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, (Ci÷4) entails (Ci∗4),
if + also satisfies (Ci∗4).
This result mirrors a result in [3], in which it was shown that TeamQueue combination
allows one to move from each (Ci∗4) to the corresponding (Ci
÷
4).
Assuming, as Nayak et al do, the following natural semantic iterated version of (TI):
(iTI4) 4Ψ+A =4Ψ∗A, if min(4,W ) * [[¬A]]
=4Ψ⊥ , otherwise
where Ψ⊥ is an ‘absurd’ epistemic state such that [Ψ⊥] = L,7 (NLI4) is equivalent to:
6 Strictly speaking, Crat is an operation on purely conditional belief sets. However, it can be
obviously generalised to the case in which the set includes non-conditionals, since for any
A ∈ L, A ∈ [Ψ ]c iff > ⇒ A ∈ [Ψ ]c.
7 Nayak et al have little to say about Ψ⊥, aside from its being the case that 4Ψ⊥÷A is such that
x ∼Ψ⊥÷A y for all x, y ∈ W . More recently, [11] have suggested that the state resulting
from expansion into inconsistency be defined in a more fine-grained manner, in a proposal that
involves introducing an ‘impossible’ world such that w⊥ |= A for all A ∈ L. We refer the
reader to their paper for further details, since nothing here hinges on the distinction between
these views.
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(iLI∗4) 4Ψ∗A=4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A
In what follows, then, we shall use (NLI4) and (iLI∗4) interchangeably. Importantly,
while the proposal considered in the previous section was reductive, in the sense that the
operator ∗ on the left-hand side of the identity did not appear on the right, (iLI∗4) fea-
tures ∗ on both sides.
To date, however, the implications of this principle have not been studied in any
kind of detail. In what follows, we offer some new results of interest. We first note:
Theorem 2. If ∗ is an elementary revision operator and÷ satisfies (C1÷4)-(C4÷4), then
∗ and ÷ satisfy (NLI4) iff they satisfy the following:
(C1÷/∗4 ) If x, y ∈ [[A]], then x 4Ψ÷¬A y iff x 4Ψ∗A y
(C2÷/∗4 ) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]], then x 4Ψ÷¬A y iff x 4Ψ∗A y
(C3÷/∗4 ) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x ≺Ψ÷¬A y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y.
(C4÷/∗4 ) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x 4Ψ÷¬A y, then x 4Ψ∗A y.
The principles (C1÷/∗4 )-(C4
÷/∗
4 ) are new to the literature and bear an obvious formal
resemblance to the postulates of Darwiche & Pearl and of Chopra et al. Taken together,
they require contraction by ¬A to be a kind of ‘mild revision’ by A, since they tell us
that the position of any A-world with respect to any ¬A-world is at least as good after
revision by A as it is after contraction by ¬A.
Somewhat surprisingly (to us), it turns out that these principles are also closely
connected to the semantic ‘TeamQueue combinator’ approach to extending the Harper
Identity to the iterated case that was proposed in [3]. Indeed, one can show that:
Theorem 3. If ∗ satisfies (C1∗4)-(C4∗4) and ÷ satisfies (C1÷4)-(C4÷4), then ∗ and ÷
satisfy (C1÷/∗4 )-(C4
÷/∗
4 ) iff they satisfy (SPU4) and (WPU4).
In conjunction with Theorem 2, Theorem 3 entails:
Corollary 1 If ∗ is an elementary revision operator and÷ satisfies (C1÷4)-(C4÷4), then
∗ and ÷ satisfy (NLI4) iff they satisfy (SPU4) and (WPU4).
In this particular context, then, (NLI4) simply amounts to the conjunction of a pair of
constraints proposed in the context of extending (HI) to the iterated case.
4.3 Rational closure and the New Levi Identity
At this stage, we have considered both a potentially promising reductive proposal and
a promising non-reductive one. A natural question, then, is: How would these two sug-
gestions fare in conjunction with one another? To answer this question, we provide the
semantic counterpart for our first principle, which was formulated only syntactically:
Theorem 4. Given AGM, (iLIRC) is equivalent to :
(iLIRC4) 4Ψ∗A=4(Ψ÷¬A)∗NA8
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With this in hand, the consequences of endorsing (iLIRC) on the heels of (NLI4)
should be obvious: rational iterated revision would have to coincide with natural revi-
sion.
This raises an interesting question: For each remaining elementary operator ∗, does
there exist a suitable alternative closure operator C, such that [Ψ ∗A]c = C([Ψ÷¬A]c∪
{A}) iff4Ψ∗A=4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A?9 Indeed, although rational closure is by far the most pop-
ular closure operator in the literature, alternative closure operators have been proposed,
including, for instance the lexicographic closure operator of [18] or again the maxi-
mum entropy closure operator of [13]. Furthermore, there has been some limited work
on potential connections between closure operators and revision operators (namely [2]).
However, this work has only focussed on the relation between lexicographic closure and
lexicographic revision and its pertinence to the current problem remains unclear.
Although we do not currently have an answer to our question, we can report that
the existence of suitable relevant closure operators will very much depend on the man-
ner in which one extends (HI) to the iterated case. To illustrate, in a previous dis-
cussion of the issue [3], we considered a particular TeamQueue combinator, ⊕STQ.
We showed, in Section 6 of that paper, that for ∗ = ∗L or ∗ = ∗R, the equality
4Ψ÷A=4Ψ ⊕STQ 4Ψ∗¬A entails that ÷ = ÷STQL, where ÷STQL is an iterated con-
traction operator that we call ‘STQ-Lex’. We can, however, show the following:
Proposition 4 If ∗ = ∗L or ∗ = ∗R and ÷ = ÷STQL, then there exists no closure
operator C, satisfying the property of Rational Identity:
(RIDc) If ∆ is rational, then C(∆) = ∆.
such that both (NLI4) and [Ψ ∗A]c = C([Ψ ÷ ¬A]c ∪ {A}) are true.
(RIDc) seems a desirable property of closure operators, which aim to extend a set of
conditionals ∆ to that rational set of conditionals whose endorsement is mandated by
that of ∆. The standard postulate of Inclusion (∆ ⊆ C(∆)) tell us that C must extend
∆ to a rational superset of ∆. (RIDc) adds to this the notion that if ∆ ‘ain’t broke’, it
needn’t be ‘fixed’.
Interestingly, the proof of this impossibility result fails to go through when ∗ = ∗L
and ÷ = ÷P, where ÷P is the priority contraction operator of [21]. In [3] we note
that priority contraction can be recovered from lexicographic revision via a particular
TeamQueue combinator. Furthermore, the same combinator can be used to define a
contraction operator from restrained revision (call it÷R). Again, the proof of the above
result breaks down when ∗ = ∗R and ÷ = ÷R.
5 Is iterated revision reducible to iterated contraction?
Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez [17, Theorem 5] plausibly claim that, for a finitely generated
language, the cardinality of (i) the set of revision operators that satisfy both the AGM
8 Note that [17] explicitly mention (iLIRC4) and flag it out as a potentially desirable principle.
9 Note the importance of (Red) in making this kind of correspondence even prima facie possi-
ble. Indeed, if (Red) fails, then4Ψ÷¬A andAwill fail to jointly determine4Ψ∗A. In syntactic
terms, [Ψ ÷ ¬A]c and A will fail to jointly determine [Ψ ∗A]c.
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postulates for revision and (C1∗4)–(C4
∗
4) is strictly greater than the cardinality of (ii)
the set of contraction operators that satisfy both the AGM postulates for contraction
and (C1÷4)–(C4
÷
4). From this, they conclude that there is no bijection between rational
iterated revision and contraction operators and hence no reduction of iterated revision
to iterated contraction.
But this conclusion is not warranted without a further argument to the effect that
every member of (i) is rational. In other words, it could be the case that (C1∗4)–(C4
∗
4)
need supplementing. This has certainly been the belief of the proponents of the various
elementary revision operators that we have discussed in the present paper. And indeed,
the proponent of ∗N could claim, endorsing our ⊕STQ-based extension of (HI), that
rational contraction goes by natural contraction. By the same principle, proponents of
∗R or ∗L could respectively claim that rational contraction goes by natural contraction
or STQ-Lex contraction, respectively (see [3, Section 6]). Those are three candidate
bijections that are all consistent, furthermore, with (NLI4).
One could nevertheless run an arguably plausible argument to Konieczny and Pino
Pe´rez’s desired conclusion based on the observation that natural and restrained revision
are both mapped onto natural contraction by the ⊕STQ method. Even if one thinks that
it is implausible to claim that iterated change must comply with one of either restrained
or natural revision, it is not implausible to claim that it sometimes may comply with
either. In other words: There plausibly exists at least one prior TPO that is rationally
consistent with two distinct potential posterior TPOs, respectively obtained via natural
and restrained revision by a given sentenceA. Given the⊕STQ-based extension of (HI),
only one posterior TPO can be obtained by contraction by ¬A, namely the one obtained
by natural contraction by ¬A. But if this is true, iterated revision dispositions cannot be
recovered from iterated contraction dispositions.
6 Conclusions and further work
We have considered two possible extensions of (LI) to the iterated case: a reductive
proposal (iLIRC) based on the rational closure operator, and a non-reductive proposal
(NLI4) that involves a contraction step, followed by an expansion. We have shown
that, when restricted to a popular class of ‘elementary’ revision operators, (NLI4) is in
fact equivalent, under weak assumptions, to both (i) a new set of postulates (C1÷/∗4 )-
(C4÷/∗4 ) and (ii) a pair of principles recently defended in the literature on (HI).
However, it has also been noted that (iLIRC) has strong consequences when con-
joined with (NLI4). This suggests the need for (1) a future consideration of various
alternatives to the former that make use of surrogate closure operators.
Furthermore, the revision operators of the class that we have focussed on have been
criticised for their equation of belief states with TPOs (the principle (Red); see [4]).
One obvious extension of our work would be (2) an exploration of the extent to which
the results reported in Section 4 carry over to operators that avoid this identification,
such as the POI operators of [5].
12 J. Chandler and R. Booth
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Appendix
Proposition 1 Given (C1∗4)–(C4∗4), (IIAI
∗
4) is equivalent to the conjunction of:
(β1∗4) If x 6∈ min(4Ψ , [[C]]), x ≺A y, and y 4Ψ∗A x, then y 4Ψ∗C x
(β2∗4) If x 6∈ min(4Ψ , [[C]]), x ≺A y, and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x
Proof: The proof of this claim closely resembles the proof of Proposition 3 of [7]. We
first establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Given (C1∗4)–(C4∗4),
(a) If x ≺A y and 4A and 4C do not agree on {x, y}, then, if y 4Ψ∗A x, then
y 4Ψ∗C x.
(b) If x ≺A y and 4A and 4C do not agree on {x, y}, then, if y ≺Ψ∗A x, then
y ≺Ψ∗C x.
We simply derive (a), since the proof of (b) is analogous. Assume that x ≺A y and 4A
and that 4C do not agree on {x, y}. In other words: x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], and either (i)
x ∈ [[C]], y ∈ [[C]], (ii) x ∈ [[¬C]], y ∈ [[¬C]] or (iii) x ∈ [[¬C]], y ∈ [[C]]. Assume that
y 4Ψ∗A x. From this and x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], it follows, by (C3∗4), that y 4Ψ x. From
this, if either (i), (ii) or (iii) hold, then, by (C1∗4), (C2
∗
4), and (C4
∗
4), respectively, we
have y 4Ψ∗C x, as required. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
With this in hand, we can derive each direction of the equivalence:
(a) From (IIAI∗4) to (β1∗4) and (β2∗4): Regarding (β1∗4), assume x 6∈ min(4Ψ , [[C]]),
x ≺A y, and y 4Ψ∗A x. If 4A and 4C do not agree on {x, y}, then the required
result follows by principle (a) of Lemma 1. So assume that they do agree, and hence
that x ≺C y. We now establish that x, y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]) ∪ min(4Ψ , [[C]]). We
already have x 6∈ min(4Ψ , [[C]]). Since, by x ≺C y, it follows that y ∈ [[¬C]], we
have y 6∈ min(4Ψ , [[C]]). Furthermore, by x ≺A y, it follows that y ∈ [[¬A]] and so
y 6∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]). Finally, assume for contradiction that x ∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]). Then
x ∈ min(4Ψ∗A,W ). Since y ∈ [[¬A]], by Success, y /∈ min(4Ψ∗A,W ). Hence
x ≺Ψ∗A y, contradicting y 4Ψ∗A x. So we can infer that x /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]). With
this in hand, we can apply (IIAI∗4) to derive y 4Ψ∗C x, as required. The derivation
of (β2∗4) is analogous.
(b) From (β1∗4) and (β2∗4) to (IIAI
∗
4): Assume that x, y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]) ∪min(4Ψ
, [[C]]) and that 4A and 4C agree on {x, y}. We want to show that x 4Ψ∗A y
iff x 4Ψ∗C y. By symmetry, it suffices for this to show that x 4Ψ∗A y implies
x 4Ψ∗C y. So assume x 4Ψ∗A y. Since 4A and 4C agree on {x, y}, we have
three cases to consider:
(i) x ≺A y and x ≺C y: Assume for contradiction that y ≺Ψ∗C x. From this, x 6∈
min(4Ψ , [[A]]) and x ≺C y, it follows by (β2∗4) that y ≺Ψ∗A x, contradicting
x 4Ψ∗A y. Hence x 4Ψ∗C y, as required.
(ii) x ∼A y and x ∼C y: It follows from this, via (C1∗4) and (C2∗4), that x 4Ψ∗A y
iff x 4Ψ y iff x 4Ψ∗C y. Hence x 4Ψ∗C y, as required.
(iii) y ≺A x and y ≺C x: By (β1∗4), it follows, from x 6∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]), y ≺A x,
and x 4Ψ∗A y, that x 4Ψ∗C y, as required. uunionsq
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Theorem 1. The only elementary revision operators are lexicographic, restrained and
natural revision.
Proof: We prove the result in its two obvious parts. First:
Lemma 2 Lexicographic, restrained and natural revision operators are elementary op-
erators
It is obvious that (Neut∗4) is satisfied by satisfied by lexicographic, restrained and nat-
ural revision operators. It is also well known that these operators satisfy (C1∗4)-(C4
∗
4).
We quickly verify here that they also satisfy (IIAP∗4):
(a) Regarding lexicographic revision: The principle actually holds without the require-
ment that x, y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]) ∪min(4Ψ ′ , [[A]]). We consider 3 cases:
(i) x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]]: Then x ≺Ψ∗A y and x ≺Ψ ′∗A y
(ii) y ∈ [[A]] and x ∈ [[¬A]]: Then y ≺Ψ∗A x and y ≺Ψ ′∗A x
(iii) x, y ∈ [[A]] or x, y ∈ [[¬A]]: Then x 4Ψ y iff x 4Ψ∗A y and x 4Ψ ′ y iff
x 4Ψ ′∗A y. Also: y 4Ψ x iff y 4Ψ∗A x and y 4Ψ ′ x iff y 4Ψ ′∗A x.
(b) Regarding restrained revision: Here we consider again 3 cases, this time depending
on the prior relation between x and y:
(i) x ∼Ψ y and x ∼Ψ ′ y: If x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], then x ≺Ψ∗A y and x ≺Ψ ′∗A
y. Similarly, if y ∈ [[A]] and x ∈ [[¬A]], then y ≺Ψ∗A x and y ≺Ψ ′∗A x. Finally,
if either x, y ∈ [[A]] or x, y ∈ [[¬A]], then x ∼Ψ∗A y and x ∼Ψ ′∗A y.
(ii) x ≺Ψ y and x ≺Ψ ′ y: Given that y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]) ∪ min(4Ψ ′ , [[A]]), we
have x ≺Ψ∗A y and x ≺Ψ ′∗A y.
(iii) y ≺Ψ x and y ≺Ψ ′ x: Given that x /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]) ∪ min(4Ψ ′ , [[A]]), we
have y ≺Ψ∗A x and y ≺Ψ ′∗A x.
(c) Regarding natural revision: Given x, y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]])∪min(4Ψ ′ , [[A]]), x 4Ψ y
iff x 4Ψ∗A y and x 4Ψ ′ y iff x 4Ψ ′∗A y. Also: y 4Ψ x iff y 4Ψ∗A x and y 4Ψ ′ x
iff y 4Ψ ′∗A x.
Regarding (IIAI∗4), we have noted, in Proposition 1, that it is equivalent, in the presence
of (C1∗4)–(C4
∗
4), to the conjunction of the principles (β1
∗
4) and (β2
∗
4). Proposition 6
of [5] establishes that a family of so-called ‘POI operators’, which includes lexico-
graphic and restrained revision, satisfies a set of principles that are collectively stronger
than (β1∗4) and (β2
∗
4). However, if one examines their proof of this claim, one can see
that it carries over to a broader family of BOI operators, which they mention in their
concluding comments and of which all three of our operators are members. Indeed, the
proof makes use of the weaker requirement that x+ ≤ x− employed in the character-
isation of BOI operators, rather than the stronger principle x+ < x− characteristic of
the POI subfamily.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2. We now show that:
Lemma 3 If an operator is elementary, then it is a lexicographic, restrained or natural
revision operator.
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(IIAP∗4) and (Neut
∗
4) jointly allows us to represent revision by a given sentence A as a
quadruple of functions from prior to posterior relations between two arbitrary worlds x
and y, such that x, y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]), one for each of the three following possibilities:
(1) x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], (2) x, y ∈ [[A]], and (3) x, y ∈ [[¬A]] (the case in which
x ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]] is determined by (1), by virtue of (Neut∗4)). These functions can be
represented by state diagrams in which the set of states is {x ≺Ψ y, x ∼Ψ y, y ≺Ψ x}
and the edges represent revisions by A. For example, ∗L gives us the following diagram
for the function associated with (1):
x ≺ y
x ∼ y
y ≺ x
The postulates (C1∗4) and (C2
∗
4) mean that the functions associated with (2) and (3)
simply map each state to itself. So whatever degrees of freedom there are, they are
associated with (1). Furthermore, the postulates (C3∗4) and (C4
∗
4) entail that the arrows
in the diagram of the function associated with (1) do not point downwards, given the
convention we are adopting for ordering the states vertically. This leaves us with at most
six possible state diagrams:
x ≺ y
x ∼ y
y ≺ x
(a)
x ≺ y
x ∼ y
y ≺ x
(b)
x ≺ y
x ∼ y
y ≺ x
(c)
x ≺ y
x ∼ y
y ≺ x
(d)
x ≺ y
x ∼ y
y ≺ x
(e)
x ≺ y
x ∼ y
y ≺ x
(f)
Diagrams (a), (b) and (c) respectively correspond to ∗RA, ∗LA and ∗NA. However,
(d) and (e) are inconsistent with (C2∗4), on pains of triviality. Indeed assume that there
exist two worlds y, z ∈ [[¬A]] and a world x ∈ [[A]], such that z ≺Ψ y ≺Ψ x. Then
z ∼Ψ∗A y, in violation of (C2∗4). (f) exhibits a similar inconsistency. Consider this
time the prior TPO given by y ≺Ψ {x,w}. We have z ≺Ψ∗A y. Given y ≺Ψ z, this is
again inconsistent with (C2∗4).
So we have established that (IIAP∗4) and (Neut
∗
4) jointly entail that, for any A,
Ψ ∗ A is equal to one of either Ψ ∗R A, Ψ ∗L A or Ψ ∗N A. But it still remains the case
that ∗ coincides with one elementary operator for one input but with another elementary
operator for another, so that, for example, Ψ ∗A = Ψ ∗RA while Ψ ∗A = Ψ ∗RA. This
is ruled out by the final condition (IIAP∗4). uunionsq
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Proposition 2 If [Ψ ∗A]c = Cn([Ψ ÷¬A]c ∪ {A}), then there are no consistent belief
sets, given the two following AGM postulates:
(K2∗) A ∈ [Ψ ∗A]
(K2÷) [Ψ ÷A] ⊆ [Ψ ]
Proof: Assume [Ψ ∗ A]c = Cn([Ψ ÷ ¬A]c ∪ {A}). By Success, A ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]. By the
Ramsey Test, > ⇒ A ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]c and so > ⇒ A ∈ Cn([Ψ ÷ ¬A]c ∪ {A}). But then,
since > ⇒ A /∈ L and, as we have stipulated, for ∆ ⊆ Lc, Cn(∆) = ∆ ∪ Cn(∆ ∩ L),
it must be the case that > ⇒ A ∈ [Ψ ÷ ¬A]c. Hence, by the Ramsey Test again, it
follows that A ∈ [Ψ ÷ ¬A]. From (K2÷), we then have A ∈ [Ψ ]. By a similar chain of
reasoning, we can establish that ¬A ∈ [Ψ ]. uunionsq
Proposition 3 If ∗ and÷ satisfy (NLI4), then, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, (Ci÷4) entails (Ci∗4),
if + also satisfies (Ci∗4).
Proof:
(a) i = 1: Assume that x, y ∈ [[A]]. We want to show that x 4(Ψ÷¬A)+A y iff x 4Ψ y.
Since ÷ satisfies (C1÷4), we have x 4Ψ÷¬A y iff x 4Ψ y. Since + satisfies (C1∗4),
we have x 4(Ψ÷¬A)+A y iff x 4Ψ÷¬A y, and we are done.
(b) i = 2: Analogous to i = 1.
(c) i = 3: Assume that x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]]. We want to show that, if x ≺Ψ y, then
x ≺(Ψ÷¬A)+A y. Assume x ≺Ψ y. By (C3÷4), x ≺Ψ÷¬A y. By (C3∗4), which +
satisfies, x 4(Ψ÷¬A)+A y, as required.
(d) i = 4: Analogous to i = 3. uunionsq
Theorem 2. If ∗ is an elementary revision operator and÷ satisfies (C1÷4)-(C4÷4), then
∗ and ÷ satisfy (NLI4) iff they satisfy the following:
(C1÷/∗4 ) If x, y ∈ [[A]], then x 4Ψ÷¬A y iff x 4Ψ∗A y
(C2÷/∗4 ) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]], then x 4Ψ÷¬A y iff x 4Ψ∗A y
(C3÷/∗4 ) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x ≺Ψ÷¬A y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y.
(C4÷/∗4 ) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x 4Ψ÷¬A y, then x 4Ψ∗A y.
Proof: We prove each direction of the claim in the form of a separate lemma. Regarding
the right-to-left direction:
Lemma 4 If ∗ is an elementary revision operator,÷ satisfies (C1÷4)-(C4÷4), and÷ and
∗ satisfy (C1÷/∗4 )-(C4÷/∗4 ), then ∗ and ÷ satisfy (NLI4).
We want to show that, given the relevant assumptions, x 4Ψ∗A y iff x 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A y.
We consider two cases:
Elementary Iterated Revision and the Levi Identity 17
(1) x or y ∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]): We first show that, if y ∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]), then x 4Ψ∗A y
iff x 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A y:
(a) Left-to-right direction (x 4Ψ∗A y ⇒ x 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A y): By Success, min(4Ψ
, [[A]]) = min(4Ψ∗A,W ), so it follows from y ∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]) that y ∈
min(4Ψ∗A,W ). Assume x 4Ψ∗A y. Then, since y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A,W ), we
have x ∈ min(4Ψ∗A,W ) and hence x ∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]). From this, it then
follows by (C2÷4) that x ∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]). Finally, by (C1∗4), we re-
cover x ∈ min(4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A, [[A]]), from which we have, by Success, x ∈
min(4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A,W ) and so x 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A y, as required.
(b) Right-to-left direction (x 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A y ⇒ x 4Ψ∗A y): It follows from
(C2÷4) that min(4Ψ , [[A]]) = min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]). From Success, we also have
min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]) = min(4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A,W ). So it follows from y ∈ min(4Ψ
, [[A]]) that y ∈ min(4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A,W ). Assume x 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A y. Then, since
y ∈ min(4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A,W ), we have x ∈ min(4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A,W ), and hence
x ∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]). But by Success, min(4Ψ , [[A]]) = min(4Ψ∗A,W ). Hence
x ∈ min(4Ψ∗A,W ) and and so x 4Ψ∗A y, as required.
The same equivalence can be even more immediately established for the case in
which x ∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]):
(a) Left-to-right direction (x 4Ψ∗A y ⇒ x 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A y): From x ∈ min(4Ψ
, [[A]]) and (C2÷4), it follows that x ∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]). From this, by (C1∗4),
we recover x ∈ min(4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A, [[A]]), from which we have, by Success, x ∈
min(4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A,W ) and so x 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A y, as required.
(b) Right-to-left direction (x 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A y ⇒ x 4Ψ∗A y): By Success, min(4Ψ
, [[A]]) = min(4Ψ∗A,W ). Hence, since x ∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]), we have x ∈
min(4Ψ∗A,W ) and and so x 4Ψ∗A y, as required.
(2) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]): If x, y ∈ [[A]] or x, y ∈ [[¬A]], the required result is immedi-
ate, following from either (C1∗4) and (C2
÷
4) or (C2
∗
4) and (C1
÷
4). This leaves the
two cases in which x and y differ with respect to their membership of [[A]]. These
are dealt with in the same manner, so we shall simply establish the result for the
case in which x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]]. Below, we find the three possible state di-
agrams for the case in which x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], and x, y /∈ min(4Ψ , [[A]]),
where the solid arrows denote transitions by revision by A. To each of these, we
have added dashed arrows to denote permissible transitions by contraction by ¬A.
Note that, since we do not assume that÷ satisfies the obvious analogue for contrac-
tion of (IIAP∗4), multiple dashed arrows from each state are permitted. Postulates
(C3÷4) and (C4
÷
4) ensure that these dashed arrows do not take us downwards. Pos-
tulates (C3÷/∗4 ) and (C4
÷/∗
4 ) ensure that they do not take us further up than the
solid arrow that originates in the same state.
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x ≺ y
x ∼ y
y ≺ x
(a)
x ≺ y
x ∼ y
y ≺ x
(b)
x ≺ y
x ∼ y
y ≺ x
(c)
(NLI4) is then satisfied iff any trip along a dashed arrow d and then a solid arrow
s ends in the state which is pointed to by the solid arrow s′ that originates in the
same place as d. This is easily verified to be true.
Regarding the left-to-right direction, we will actually prove the following stronger
claim:
Lemma 5 If ∗ satisfies (C1∗4)–(C4∗4), then there exists ÷ such that ∗ and ÷ satisfy
(NLI4) only if ∗ and ÷ satisfy (C1÷/∗4 )–(C4÷/∗4 )
We establish the necessity of each of (C1÷/∗4 )–(C4
÷/∗
4 ) in turn:
(1) Regarding (C1÷/∗4 ): Assume that (C1÷/∗4 ) fails, so that x, y ∈ [[A]] and either (i)
x 4Ψ÷¬A y but y ≺Ψ∗A x or (ii) y ≺Ψ÷¬A x but x 4Ψ∗A y. Assume (i). From
x 4Ψ÷¬A y, it follows, by (C1∗4), that x 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗A y. By (NLI4), we then have
x 4Ψ∗A y. Contradiction. Assuming (ii) leads to a contradiction in an analogous
manner.
(2) Regarding (C2÷/∗4 ): As for (C1÷/∗4 ), using (C2∗4).
(3) Regarding (C3÷/∗4 ): Assume (C3÷/∗4 ) fails, so that x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], x ≺Ψ÷¬A
y, but y 4Ψ∗A x. From x ≺Ψ÷¬A y, by (C3∗4), it follows that x ≺(Ψ÷¬A)∗A y. By
(NLI4), we then have x ≺Ψ∗A y. Contradiction.
(4) Regarding (C4÷/∗4 ): As for (C3÷/∗4 ), using (C4∗4). uunionsq
Theorem 3. If ∗ satisfies (C1∗4)-(C4∗4) and ÷ satisfies (C1÷4)-(C4÷4), then ∗ and ÷
satisfy (C1÷/∗4 )-(C4
÷/∗
4 ) iff they satisfy (SPU4) and (WPU4).
Proof: We prove the result in two parts. Firstly we establish the following strengthening
of the right-to-left direction of the claim:
Lemma 6 Given (SPU4) and (WPU4), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, (Ci∗4) entails (Ci÷/∗4 ),
where:
(C1÷/∗4 ) If x, y ∈ [[A]], then x 4Ψ÷¬A y iff x 4Ψ∗A y
(C2÷/∗4 ) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]], then x 4Ψ÷¬A y iff x 4Ψ∗A y
(C3÷/∗4 ) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], and x ≺Ψ÷¬A y,then x ≺Ψ∗A y.
(C4÷/∗4 ) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], and x 4Ψ÷¬A y, then x 4Ψ∗A y.
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(a) Regarding i = 1, 2: We provide the proof for i = 1, since the case in which i = 2 is
handled analogously. Assume x, y ∈ [[A]]. From left to right: Assume x 4Ψ÷¬A y.
By the contrapositve of (SPU4), either x 4Ψ y or x 4Ψ∗A y. If the latter holds, we
are done. So assume that x 4Ψ y. Then the required result follows by (C1∗4). From
right to left: Assume x 4Ψ∗A y. By (C1∗4), x 4Ψ y. By (WPU4), x 4Ψ÷¬A y, as
required.
(b) Regarding i = 3, 4: We provide the proof for i = 3, since the case in which
i = 4 is handled analogously (using (SPU4) rather than (WPU4)). We derive the
contrapositive. Assume x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y 4Ψ∗A x. If y 4Ψ x, then, from
y 4Ψ∗A x, we have y 4Ψ÷¬A x, by (WPU4), as required. So assume x ≺Ψ y. By
(C3∗4), x ≺Ψ∗A y. Contradiction.
This completes the proof of Lemma 6. Concerning the left-to-right direction of our
principal claim, we show:
Lemma 7 Given (C3÷4) and (C4÷4), (C1
÷/∗
4 ) to (C4
÷/∗
4 ) collectively entail both
(SPU4) and (WPU4). (Alternatively: Given (C1÷4) to (C4
÷
4), (C3
÷/∗
4 ) and (C4
÷/∗
4 )
jointly entail both (SPU4) and (WPU4).)
We just prove this in relation to (WPU4), using (C1
÷/∗
4 ), (C2
÷/∗
4 ), (C3
÷/∗
4 ) and (C4÷4).
The proof in relation to (SPU4) is analogous but uses (C1
÷/∗
4 ), (C2
÷/∗
4 ), (C4
÷/∗
4 ) and
(C3÷4) instead. Assume that x 4Ψ y and x 4Ψ∗A y. We want to show x 4Ψ÷¬A y.
If (a) x, y ∈ [[A]], (b) x, y ∈ [[¬A]], or (c) x ∈ [[¬A]] and y ∈ [[A]], this follows from
x 4Ψ∗A y, by (C1÷/∗4 ), (C2÷/∗4 ) or (C3÷/∗4 ), respectively. If (d) x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]],
then it follows from x 4Ψ y, by (C4÷4).
Note that we can also substitute (C1÷4) and (C2
÷
4) for (C1
÷/∗
4 ) and (C2
÷/∗
4 ), ob-
taining the required result from x 4Ψ y instead of x 4Ψ∗A y. uunionsq
Theorem 4. Given AGM, (iLIRC) is equivalent to :
(iLIRC4) 4Ψ∗A=4(Ψ÷¬A)∗NA10
Proof: We prove the claim by establishing that (iLIRC) ensures that 4Ψ∗A is the
‘flattest’ TPO–in a technical sense to be defined below–such that the following lower
bound constraint is satisfied:
[Ψ ÷ ¬A]c ∪ {A} ⊆ [Ψ ∗A]c
In view of Definitions 20 and 21 of [19], the upshot of this is then that 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗NA is
the unique TPO corresponding to the rational closure of [Ψ ÷ ¬A]c ∪ {A}.
We first note that, given AGM, the lower bound principle can be semantically ex-
pressed as follows:
(a) If x ≺Ψ÷¬A y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y and
(b) min(4Ψ∗A,W ) ⊆ [[A]]
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Indeed, the lower bound constraint simply amounts to the conjunction of Success, which
is equivalent to (b), with the claim that [Ψ ÷ ¬A]c ⊆ [Ψ ∗ A]c, which is equivalent to
(a). With this in hand, we now prove two lemmas. First:
Lemma 8 If ∗ and ÷ satisfy (iLIRC4), then they satisfy the lower bound principle.
Establishing satisfaction of (b) is trivial. So we just need to establish satisfaction of (a).
Assume x ≺Ψ÷¬A y. Given (iLIRC), we will have x ≺Ψ∗A y iff either
(1) x ∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]) and y /∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]), or
(2) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]) and x ≺Ψ÷¬A y
Note first that y /∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]). Indeed, assume that this were false. Since
we know that min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]) ⊆ min(4Ψ÷¬A,W ), this would mean that y ∈
min(4Ψ÷¬A,W ). But this is inconsistent with x ≺Ψ÷¬A y. This leaves us with two
possibilities. The first is that x, y /∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]), which, given x ≺Ψ÷¬A y,
places us in case (2). The second is that x ∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]) and y /∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A
, [[A]]), which places us in case (1). Either way, then, x ≺Ψ∗A y, as required. This
completes the proof of Lemma 8.
For our second lemma, we will make use of the convenient representation of TPOs
by their corresponding ordered partitions of W . The ordered partition 〈S1, S2, . . . Sm〉
ofW corresponding to a TPO4 is such that x 4 y iff r(x,4) ≤ r(y,4), where r(x,4)
denotes the ‘rank’ of x with respect to 4 and is defined by taking Sr(x,4) to be the cell
in the partition that contains x.
This lemma is given as follows:
Lemma 9 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗NA w 4, for any TPO 4 satisfying the lower bound principle.
where:
Definition 5. w is a binary relation on the set of TPOs over W such such that,
for any TPOs 41 and 42, whose corresponding ordered partitions are given by
〈S1, S2, . . . , Sm〉 and 〈T1, T2, . . . , Tm〉 respectively, 41 w 42 iff either (i) Si = Ti
for all i = 1, . . . ,m, or (ii) Si ⊃ Ti for the first i such that Si 6= Ti.
w partially orders TPO(W ) according to comparative ‘flatness’, with the flatter TPOs
appearing ‘greater’ in the ordering, so that41 w 42 iff41 is at least as as flat as42.
Let 〈T1, . . . , Tm〉 be the ordered partition corresponding to the TPO 4(Ψ÷¬A)∗NA,
which we will denote by 4N. Let 4 be any TPO satisfying the lower bound condition:
(a) If x ≺Ψ÷¬A y, then x ≺ y and
(b) min(4,W ) ⊆ [[A]].
Let 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉 be its corresponding ordered partition. We must show that the follow-
ing relation holds: 4N w 4.
If Ti = Si for all i, then we are done. So let i be minimal such that Ti 6= Si. We
must show Si ⊂ Ti. So let y ∈ Si and assume, for contradiction, that y /∈ Ti. We know
that Ti 6= ∅, since, otherwise,
⋃
j<i Tj = W , hence
⋃
j<i Sj = W and so Si = ∅,
contradicting Si 6= Ti. So let x ∈ Ti. Then, since y /∈ Ti, we have x ≺N y. We are
going to show that this entails that ∃z such that
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(i) z ∼N x, i.e. z ∈ Ti and
(ii) z ≺ y.
But if it were the case that z ≺ y, then, since y ∈ Si, z ∈
⋃
j<i Sj =
⋃
j<i Tj ,
contradicting z ∈ Ti. Hence y ∈ Ti and so we can conclude that Si ⊂ Ti, as required.
Given x ≺N y, by the definition of ∗N, one of the following must hold:
(1) x ∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]) and y /∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]):
(a) y ∈ [[A]]: We again have x ≺Ψ÷¬A y, and so x ≺ y once more. Then, x plays
the role of the required z, satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) above, and we are
done.
(b) y ∈ [[¬A]]: If x ∈ min(4,W ), then by (b) and y ∈ [[¬A]], it follows that x ≺ y
and we are done. So assume x /∈ min(4,W ). Let z ∈ min(4,W ). We have
z ≺ x and, by (b), z ∈ [[A]]. By the contrapositive of (a), it follows from z ≺ x
that z 4Ψ÷¬A x. From this, x ∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]) and z ∈ [[A]], we then have
z ∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]). But, by the definition of ∗N, x, z ∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]])
entails that z ∼N x. Finally, since z ∈ min(4,W ), min(4,W ) ⊆ [[A]] and
y ∈ [[¬A]], we have z ≺ y. Here, z satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) above and
we are done.
(2) x, y /∈ min(4Ψ÷¬A, [[A]]) and x ≺Ψ÷¬A y: Since x ≺Ψ÷¬A y, by (a) above, we
have x ≺ y.
This completes the proof of Lemma 9. uunionsq
Proposition 4 If ∗ = ∗L or ∗ = ∗R and ÷ = ÷STQL, then there exists no closure
operator C, satisfying the property of Rational Identity:
(RIDc) If ∆ is rational, then C(∆) = ∆.
such that both (NLI4) and [Ψ ∗A]c = C([Ψ ÷ ¬A]c ∪ {A}) are true.
Proof: Assume for reductio that there is a closure operator C, satisfying (RIDc) and
such that both (NLI4) and [Ψ ∗A]c = C([Ψ ÷¬A]c ∪{A}) are true. We will show that
the following then holds: If A ∈ [Ψ ], then [Ψ ÷ ¬A]c = [Ψ ∗A]c.
Assume A ∈ [Ψ ]. By the AGM postulate (C3∗), which entails that, if ¬A /∈ [Ψ ],
then [Ψ÷¬A] = [Ψ ], it then follows thatA ∈ [Ψ÷¬A]. Hence, C([Ψ÷¬A]c∪{A}) =
C([Ψ ÷ ¬A]c). Since [Ψ ÷ ¬A]c is rational, by (RIDc), C([Ψ ÷ ¬A]c) = [Ψ ÷ ¬A]c.
Hence, C([Ψ÷¬A]c∪{A}) = [Ψ÷¬A]c. Given AGM and the Ramsey Test, (NLI4) is
equivalent to [Ψ ∗A]c = [(Ψ ÷¬A) ∗A]c. So, in view of the previous equality, we can
conclude that [Ψ ∗A]c = [Ψ ÷ ¬A]c.
But now, the following model provides a case in which A ∈ [Ψ ], but [Ψ ÷ ¬A]c 6=
[Ψ ∗A]c:
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AB AB AB AB
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∗R/LA
÷STQL¬A
uunionsq
